Republic vs Cagandahan

Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth.  During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized.  She likewise has no breast nor menstruation.  Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen.  According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.  She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.  SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.  As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male.  Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.  It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. 

Llaneta vs Agrava

Llaneta vs. Agrava

GR No. 32054, May 15, 1974

FACTS:

Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer.  Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born.  All of them lived with Serafin’s mother in Manila.  Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records.  She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant.  Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion among persons and entitites she dealt with and would entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.  In support to her petition, the mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of Ferrer with her.  Furthermore, adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of Serafin Ferrer.  

Laperal vs Republic

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.   

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

Libi vs IAC

Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic.  Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats.  One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun.  The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages.  Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.  The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.  However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.  Each of the spouses had their own key.  She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.  Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept.  The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

St. Mary's Academy vs Carpetanos

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.  Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign.  Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school.  It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.  Sherwin died due to this accident. 

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.  However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident.  It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes.  The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner.  The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.  Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva.  The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3^rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road.  It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.  Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Ylarde vs Aquino

Ylarde vs. Aquino

GR No. L33722, July 29, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan.  Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein.  During that time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II.  Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried.  It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation.  Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope.  It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”.  After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down.  Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter.  The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.

HELD:

As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students”.  Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule.  However, in casea of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.  In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.  Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are protected from all harm.  The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc.  Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students.  Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children.  He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the petitioners.  

Amadora vs CA

Amadora vs. CA

GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death.  Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.  The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.  Complaints against the students were dropped.  Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.  Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.  On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision.  Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. 

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.  Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.  Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

Petition was denied.

Espiritu vs CA

Espiritu vs. CA

GR 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US.  Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post.  They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind.  After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married.  Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.  In 1990, they decided to separate.  Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.  Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.  When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children. 

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons.  The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive.  At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age.  The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered.  It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt.  She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity.  Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend.  On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.    

Hence, petition was granted.  Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

De Asis vs CA

De Asis vs. CA

GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands.  Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action.  They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim.  However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother.  Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case.  He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support. 

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person.  The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.  With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself.  While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court.  It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.  Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect).  Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

Javier vs Lucero

Javier vs Lucero

GR No. L-6706, March 29, 1953

FACTS:

Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son before they got married, named Alfredo Jr.  After the celebration of marriage, the father went to US since he was listed as US Navy.  The mother and Alfredo Jr. went to live with her parents while the husband was in US.  When the relationship between the spouses become strained, husband petitioned for divorce before State of Alabama.  After the decree was issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice (having been divorced with the former before celebration of subsequent marriage).

An action for alimony was filed where respondent Judge ordered the father to give a monthly allowance of P60 to his wife and son.  The father filed notice of appeal questioning the status of the wife; second, the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer entitled to be supported and third, decision is vague and silent in relation to granting the son entitlement to support even if over 21 years old for purposes of completing his education/ training for some profession, trade or vocation.  Nevertheless, the judge directed the father to pay the monthly pensions notwithstanding pendency of the appeal.

ISSUE: WON Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support.

HELD:

Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of majority in order enable him to complete his education, for some trade and profession.

If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly delayed.  This is a good reason for immediate execution.  The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying.  However, it might have resulted to lack of means to support his studies considering that the father admits that the son is just a pre-law graduate.

Tamargo vs CA

Tamargo vs CA

GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.  

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

Republic vs CA and Bobiles

Republic vs CA and Bobiles

GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since 4 months old.  Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance.  The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court.  Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.  The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to “Bobiles”. 

ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.

HELD:

The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them.  After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory. 

Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding.  The Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights.  When Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced.  A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time.  Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson.  His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner.   Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.

Hence, Petition was denied.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.  Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.  The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen.  He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Teotico vs Del Val

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000.  She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses.  Among the legacies made in the will was the  P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera.  The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.  Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will.  Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that  said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.  Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate.  She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE.  Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law.  As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. 

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.

Abadilla vs Tabiliran

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran

AM No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995

FACTS:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.  With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela.  Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986.  On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.  The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral.  However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

ISSUE: WON the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

HELD:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita.  Only natural children can be legitimated.  Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. 

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.  Reasons for this limitation:

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. 

Marquino vs IAC

Marquino vs. IAC

GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994

Eustiquio Marquino and Maria Terenal-Marquino (wife) survived by Luz Marquino, Ana Marquino and Eva Marquino “legitimate children” (Petitioners)

Bibiana Romano-Pagadora survived by Pedro, Emy, June, Edgar, May, Mago, Arden and Mars Pagadora (Respondents)

FACTS:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio.  Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single.  It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete.  She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family.  The Marquinos denied all these.  Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive.  Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. 

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:

1.  WON right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and 

2.  WON Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

HELD:

SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.  The right is purely a personal one to the natural child.  The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.

IAC decision was reversed and set aside.  Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.

Jison vs CA

Jison vs. CA

GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.  

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family.  It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.  Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.     

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.  Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.


The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1.     That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former;

2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity.  With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.  Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.


Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.

Bernabe vs Alejo

Bernabe vs. Alejo

GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981.  After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina.  Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate.

Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.

CA ruling:  The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

HELD:

The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.

Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.

Hence, the petition wad denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

Constantino vs Mendez

Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages.  The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.  Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man.  In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.  Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.     

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.  Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.  More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Eceta vs Eceta

Eceta vs Eceta

GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Rosalina Vda de Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta in 1926.  They had a son named Vicente.  The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs.  However, the deceased has an illegitimate daughter named Theresa whose grandmother was Rosalina, the petitioner. 

ISSUE: WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to prove the filiation with the deceased.

HELD:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.  However, what was tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only.  The filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue.  In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter.  The deceased establishing acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa nevertheless signed the duly authenticated birth certificate shown by the latter.  Hence, the Court granted 1/8 share of the land to Theresa.

Liyao vs Liyao

Liyao vs. Liyao

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights.  Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.  There were two sides of the story.  Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased.  On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased.

HELD:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.  Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Concepcion vs CA

Concepcion vs. CA

GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990.  The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.  Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.  Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”.  She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname.  After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario.  Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.           

HELD:

Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.  Theresa’s contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo.  In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.  Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the son’s legitimacy.  Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”.  Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.  As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames.  Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.       

Benitez-Badua vs CA

Benitez-Badua vs. CA

GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna.  Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.  Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.  The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted.  The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents.  She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.  On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child.  Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. 

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit.  The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption.  It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights.  Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter.  In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”.  In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner’s father.

Andal vs Macaraig

Andal vs. Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas.  Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano.  The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941.  His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm.   Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed.  Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s father until 1943.  Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral.  On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage.  The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.  This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.  Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.   Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.

Manacop vs CA

Manacop vs. CA

GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City.  The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).  The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former.  Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner.  The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code.  Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.  Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC.

Mondequillo vs Breva

Mondequillo vs Breva

GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name.  A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.  With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority.  The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.  Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.  It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code.  The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.  The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code.  This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.  Petition was dismissed.

Albano vs Gapusan

Albano vs. Gapusan

AM No. 1022-MJ, May 7, 1976

FACTS:

Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action involving latter’s malpractice in his notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.  Likewise, a complaint was filed alleging that said Judge influenced Judge Crispin of CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal cases.  In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse guilty of adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children with her paramour.  He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would live together in case of reconciliation.

ISSUE: WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses.

HELD:

A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership.

There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said separation agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs.  The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.  To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution of the partnership.  SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as contrary to law.

Manalo vs CA

Manalo vs CA

GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children.  The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac.  In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.  Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. 

ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling.  The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.  The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.  It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right.  It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.  The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.  Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.    

Hontiveros vs RTC

Hontiveros vs. RTC

GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.  The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case.  In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.  They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.  On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession.  Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.  Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood.  Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction.  Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.